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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Undoubtedly constitutional tests of anti-discrimination legislation will soon
be forthcoming. Although individual statutes may be set aside because poorly
formulated or unfairly applied, it is submitted that the power of the state to
regulate private property rights for the purpose of eliminating discrimination
will be upheld.
A NEW THEORY IN PRENATAL INJURIES: THE BIOLOGICAL
APPROACH
Prior to 1946, the common law denied a child the right to recover for prenatal
injuries. A majority of jurisdictions have since recognized a surviving child's
right to recover for injuries inflicted upon a foetus capable of extra-uterine
existence. And recently, two cases extended the right to recover for injuries
suffered at any time after conception.'
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
The first reported case on the problem is Dietrich v. Northampton,2 decided
by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1884. The mother, more than four
months pregnant, fell and suffered a miscarriage as a result of defendant's negli-
gence. There were some indications of life in the child for about fifteen minutes.
In the action brought by an administrator under a wrongful death statute the
court held that the child was not at the time of the injury a "person" within the
meaning of the statute; that the unborn child, en ventre sa mere, was part of the
mother; and therefore refused any recovery.
Notwithstanding that the case was concerned solely with the construction of
a wrongful death statute, it was later taken as authority for holding that no cause
of action at all could be maintained by the surviving child for prenatal injury.
Thus, an Illinois court denied recovery to a child born crippled as a result of an
injury.3 Despite the fact that the mother was about to be delivered of the
child when the negligent act occurred, and although the causal relationship was
quite apparent, the court reaffirmed the Dietrich reasoning that the child was
in the view of the common law a part of the mother and hence no duty was
owing to it.
Other courts found additional reasons for denying recovery. One court held
that the defendant, a common carrier, had no contractual relationship with the
"non-existent" child and therefore owed a duty of care only to the mother.4
Another expressed the fear that if such an action could be maintained, an
infant might sue its own mother for injury occasioned by her negligence while
pregnant.5 But perhaps the most cogent argument advanced for the denial of
recovery stemmed from the practical consideration that there was an inherent
1. See Annot. 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950); Annot. 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953).
2. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
3. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
4. Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y. Supp. 367 (2d Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 209 N.Y. 515, 102 N.E. 1107 (1913).
5. Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
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difficulty in the proof of causation, and consequently a flood of fictitious claims
might result.
While the law protected unborn children especially in will construction cases,7
in the rules of descent and distribution8 and in criminal cases0 it continued to
refuse protection in negligence.' 0
After the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1933, recognized the child's cause of
action for prenatal injuries" and the California legislature, in 1939, abrogated
the common-law no-liability rule,' 2 the courts in the United States began to take
cognizance of the medical fact that at some time during the period of gestation,
the infant, yet unborn, reaches a state of development where it can live outside
the mother; 13 that to deny a separate existence to such a foetus is to deny a
a fact; that to deny such a fact "is to do reverence to an outmoded, timeworn
fiction not founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and unjusti-
fied"; 14 that if the law of property and the law of crimes do not look on the
unborn child as "part of the mother" the law of torts should not either.15 The
arguments against recovery which were founded on difficulty of proof of causa-
tion and a fear of a flood of fictitious claims were also repudiated. It was said
that the courts should not refuse to entertain suits for the redress of wrongs
because a plaintiff would have difficulty in proving his case or because an
afforded remedy may at times give rise to fraudulent claims.' 0 "The right to
bring an action is clearly distinguishable from the ability to prove facts. The
first cannot be denied because the second may not exist .. .. Fraud can be
dealt with in this class of cases, just as in others, and the detection and the
elimination of faked contentions present no novel question to judicial bodies."'-
6. Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
7. The word "children" or "issue", as used in a bequest or devise, may include a child
en ventre sa mere. 57 Am. Jur., Wills §§ 154, 1334 (1943).
3. With respect to the rights of inheritance, posthumous children are regarded as in ease
from the time of conception. 16 Am. Jur., Descent and Distribution § E0 (1933).
9. One who feloniously inflicts injuries upon an unborn child, which is born alive but
subsequently dies from the injuries, is chargeable with homicide as in the care of the illing
of any human being. 26 Am. Jur., Homicide § 32 (1940).
10. Restatement, Torts § S69 (1939) reads: "A person who negligently caus. harm to
an unborn child is not liable to such child for the harm." In a caveat following, the Institute
cautions that it takes no stand as to liability where the injury is inflicted by intentional or
reckless conduct without excuse.
11. Montreal Tramways Co. v. Le V&ll6, [1933] Can. Sup. Ct. 456, 4 D.L.R. 337.
12. Cal. Ci. Code § 29 (Deering 1949).
13. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953), overruling Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 134 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
14. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951), overruling Drobner
v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
15. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1946).
16. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 673 (1939) ; Verkennes v. Cornelea,
229 Minn. 365, 33 N.W.2d 833 (1949); Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1244, 258 S.W.2d S77
(1953).
17. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 425, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951).
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A New York court, in overruling its earlier holding and recognizing the child's
action, said that the question of causation, reasonable certainty and the like
which arise in prenatal injury cases are no different, in kind, from the ones
which were resolved in thousands of other negligence cases.18
Thus, what had been an inflexible rule of law for over six decades progressively
deteriorated and was ultimately destroyed. Once the judiciary accepted the
medical fact that the infant does exist separately before birth, it was then faced
with the problem of fixing the point of time at which the existence legally began.
VIABILITY THEORY
As early as 1900, Justice Boggs in his dissenting opinion in Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital19 pointed out that when an infant reaches that stage in its
development known as "viability'"-when it thereafter could be severed from
the mother prematurely and still live-it is as much alive as it would be at the
time of normal birth. Therefore, from the time it is viable, the child should be
regarded as a legal person.20 This viability theory was used to permit a child,
born alive, recovery. In Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.21 the court
stated that the viable child en ventre sa mere at the time it sustained injury was
a "person" within the constitutional provision allowing every person a remedy
for injury done to his person. The Williams case was followed by a majority of
jurisdictions. 22
It should be noted that most courts adhere to the requirement that the infant
must have been born alive, or, in an action for wrongful death, that the infant
must have died after birth as a result of the prenatal injuries. Three jurisdic-
tions, however, have allowed recovery for wrongful death where the infant was
born dead but had reached a viable stage at the time of the injury causing the
death of the infant while in its mother's womb.23
18. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
19. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
20. Justice Boggs said: "A foetus in the womb of the mother may well be regarded as but
a part of the bowels of the mother during a portion of the period of gestation; but if, while
in the womb, it reaches that prenatal age of viability when the destruction of the life of the
mother does not necessarily end its existence also, and when, if separated prematurely, and
by artificial means, from the mother, it would be so far a matured human being as that It
would live and grow, mentally and physically, as other children generally, it is but to deny
a palpable fact to argue there is but one life, and that the life of the mother." Id. at 364,
56 N.E. at 641.
21. 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
22. Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (Super. Ct.
1955) ; Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (Super. Ct. 1955) ;
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Amann
v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d
550 (1951) ; Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Poliquin v. Mac-
donald, - N.H. -, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691
(1951); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950); Mallison v. Pomeroy,
205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955).
23. Mitchel v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Verkennes v. Corneiea, 229 Minn. 365,
38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954).
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NEW ,INORITY'S EXTENSION OF LIABILITY AND REJECTION OF
THE VIABILITY THEORY
A California enactment 24 and recent decisions indicate that the law is moving
towards an acceptance of the biological fact that a human life comes into exdst-
ence at the time of conception. This was the rationale of Kelly v. Gregory,2
a 1953 decision of a New York intermediate appellate court which rejected the
limitations of the viability theory and held that an infant born alive may
recover for injuries sustained at any period of its prenatal life if it can prove
that they were sustained as a result of a tort. The court said: "we ought to be
safe . . . in saying that legal separability should begin where there is biological
separability. We know something more of the actual process of conception and
foetal development now than when some of the common law cases were decided;
and what we know makes it possible to demonstrate clearly that separability
begins at conception." -'
In 1957 the Georgia Supreme Court in Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line
Co.2 7 became the first court of last resort to adopt this thinking. It expressly
held the particular moment of the prenatal injury to be immaterial.2 S It is safe
to predict that the viability theor, will, sooner or later, yield to this reasoning,
once the concept of separability of the unborn infant from the mother has been
legally recognized and the "difficult-to-prove" argument is more uniformly
repudiated. The present minority position gathers respect in logic and reason-
ableness when the viability theory, which it rejects, is subjected to both a
theoretical and a factual analysis.
CRITICISM OF THE VLBILITY THEORY
There is a theoretical fallacy in the idea that a viable child is in all respects
as complete a personality before birth as any other person after birth, and that
it therefore should possess a status of a natural, legal person. This idea was
carried by some courts to its logical conclusion that there is a cause of action
for wrongful death of a viable infant, a foetus that died in the mother's womb
as a result of the injury.29 It is doubtful whether such a view can be accepted
without substantially changing the convenient and fundamental rule that fixes
24. In California, the legislature has incorporated into its wrongful death statute a
provision that "a child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person,
so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth." Cal. Civ.
Code § 29 (Deering 1949). The "interests" referred to have been held to include not only
inheritance and property rights, but also the right to compensation for perasonal injuries
inflicted any time after conception. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 673
(1939). This right of recovery does not include a child that was never born alive, because
the statutory right is created only in event of the child's subsequent birth. Norman
v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 26S P.2d 178 (1954).
25. 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953).
26. Id. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697. The decision extended Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y.
349, 102 N.E.2d 691, in which the recovery was confined to a viable infant.
27. 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
23. Id. at 505, 93 S.E.2d at 728.
29. See note 23 supra.
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birth as the precise point at which the existence of a natural (legal) person
begins. A foetus not born alive has never been treated as a legal person, that
is, as a person capable of having and acquiring rights. The law does not provide
for administration in case of a miscarriage or dead-born foetus, whether the
foetus was viable or not. An unborn infant cannot presently acquire property,
cannot sue or be sued. He who is not born alive never exists as a legal person.
Other courts applying the viability theory, however, require that the infant be
born alive as a condition for granting of a remedy either to the living child or
under a wrongful death statute.30 Then the viability theory, used as such, seems
to contradict itself. The theory thus lends the viable child a status of a legal
person for limited purpose only. That is to say, it imposes a legal fiction, similar
to the protection afforded in property law to an unborn child subject to his being
born alive. While the legal fiction fits the peculiar character of property law
without disturbing any legal concept, it does not, however, fit to the law of
negligence. While property rights can be preserved for a person not yet in
existence through the ingenious means of legal fiction, one cannot create a
personal wrong and consequently a tortfeasor by legal fiction. Thus we cannot,
without theoretical objection, import legal fiction from the law of property and
use it as a basis for creating a tortious liability for prenatal injury.
If then there should be a remedy either to a living child for its prenatal
injury, or a remedy under a wrongful death statute where the infant died after
birth as the result of the prenatal injury, it must be on some other theory.
The viability theory is equally unrealistic. It draws an arbitrary line between
liability and non-liability. It fails to recognize the biological fact that even
before the stage of viability there is a living human being. The viability theory
seeks to eliminate injustice by being half just. While the acceptance of the
viability theory by the majority of courts was generated by the desire to do
justice and reference was made to the legal protection of unborn children in
property law, the fact is that in the law of property legal protection is afforded
unborn children from the time of conception and not from the time of viability.3 '
The claim of the living child injured before viability is no less meritorious than
that of the child injured during the viable stage even though the problem of
proof would increase as the injury occurs earlier in the term of gestation.
BIOLOGIcAL THEORY
The more logical view was taken in the Kelly and Hornbuckle cases. They
recognized that a legal separability begins with the biological separability, that
is, at conception. Neither of these cases seems to regard unborn infants (whether
viable or not) as legal persons, but rather as separate entities or human beings
in the biological sense from the time of conception with a potentiality of
personality which is not realized until birth. A prenatal injury to that separate
entity, a human being in the biological sense, would impose a conditional liability
on the tortfeasor. When the separate entity becomes at birth a legal person the
liability would be complete. If personality was never achieved there would be
30. See note 22 supra.
31. See note 8 supra.
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